

PSC535
Professor Rothenberg
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Bureaucratic Politics
Spring 2025

Course Purpose: We overview the literature on bureaucratic politics, particularly as it relates to the American political system (however, we can build in a more comparative component if students care to explore). Emphasis is on current major research areas (rather than a survey of previous decades' "greatest hits"), of which there are quite a few, as both the real-world importance of the American bureaucracy and the scholarly interest in the executive branch and related agencies has grown considerably in recent years.

Availability: If you want to get in touch with me outside of class for any reason, feel free to stop by Harkness 108 or send me an e-mail at lawrence.rothenberg@rochester.edu.

Requirements: Course requirements include research presentations and a longer final paper—either original research, a detailed literature review, or a research proposal (roughly 15 pages will suffice).

Readings: Required readings will be made available through Dropbox.

Grading: Grading will reflect your class participation and your final paper (weighted approximately 1/2, 1/2).

I. *Introduction* (1/24)

II. *Bureaucratic Delegation and Discretion—and its Measurement* (1/27)

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. "Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 697-722.

Hill, Adam. 2015. "Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control," *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 12 (2): 311-339.

Bolton, Alexander, and Sharece Thrower. 2019. "The Constraining Power of the Purse: Executive Discretion and Legislative Appropriations," *Journal of Politics* 81 (4): 1266-1281.

Vannoni, Matia, Elliot Ash, and Massimo Morelli. 2021. "Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts: Methods and Application to U.S. States," *Political Analysis* 29 (1): 43-57.

Smith, Natalie L., and Susan Webb Yackee. 2024. "A New Measure of US Public Agency Policy Discretion," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 34 (3): 404-417.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge.

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test," *Journal of Politics* 58 (2): 373-397.

Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (2): 330-345.

Bendor, Jonathan, and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation," *American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 293-310.

Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," *American Economics Review* 94 (4): 1034-1054.

Prendergast, Canice. 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," *American Economics Review* 97 (1): 180-196.

- Fox, Justin, and Stuart V. Jordan. 2011. "Delegation and Accountability," *Journal of Politics* 73 (3): 831-844.
- Ting, Michael M., James M. Snyder, Shigeo Hirano, and Olle Folke. 2013. "Elections and Reform: The Adoption of Civil Service in the U.S. States," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25 (3): 363-387.
- Prendergast, Canice. 2016. "Bureaucratic Responses," *Journal of Labor Economics* 34 (2): S183-215.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2019. "Giving Advice vs. Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation," *Political Science Research and Methods* 7 (3): 471-488.
- Anastasopoulos, Jason, and Anthony Bertelli. 2020. "Understanding Delegation through Machine Learning: A Method and Application to the European Union," *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 291-301.
- Lerner, Joshua Y., and Gregory P. Spell. 2021. "Using Deep and Active Learning Classifiers to Identify Congressional Delegation to Administrative Agencies." chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cape.ucmerced.edu/sites/cape.ucmerced.edu/files/page/documents/bussing-lerner-spell-delegation.pdf
- McCann, Pamela J. Clouser, and Charles R. Shipan. 2022. "How Many Major US Laws Delegate to Federal Agencies? (Almost) All of Them," *Political Science Research and Methods* 10 (21): 438-444.
- Walters, Daniel E., and Elliott Ash. 2023. "If We Build It, Will They Legislate? Empirically Testing the Potential of the Nondelegation Doctrine to Curb Congressional "Abdication,"" *Cornell Law Review* 108 (2): 401-492.

III. *The Civil Service System* (2/3)

- Ujhelyi, Gergely. 2014. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 6 (2): 338-380.
- Gibbs, Daniel. 2020. "Civil Service Reform, Self-Selection, and Bureaucratic Performance," *Economics & Politics* 32 (2): 279-304.
- Bolton, Alexander, John M De Figueiredo, and David E. Lewis. 2021. "Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the US Federal Government," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 31 (2): 451-466.

Moreira, Diana, and Santiago Pérez. 2022. "Who Benefits from Meritocracy?," https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30113/w30113.pdf.

Feinstein, Brian D., and Jennifer Nou. 2023. "Strategic Subdelegation," *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 20 (4) 746-817.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Doherty, Kathleen, David Lewis, Scott Limbocker. 2019. "Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (2): 159-174.

Forand, Jean Guillaume. 2019. "Civil Service and the Growth of Government," *Journal of Public Economics* 177 (1): 1-17.

Cameron, Charles M. and John M. de Figueiredo. 2020. "Quitting in Protest: Presidential Policymaking and Civil Service Response," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 15 (4): 507-538.

Bugarin, Mauricio S., and David E. Lewis. 2021. "Building Effective Bureaucracy: Career Concerns, Productivity, and Politicization in the Public Sector," working paper.

Huber, John D., and Michael M. Ting. 2021. "Civil Service and Patronage in Bureaucracies." *Journal of Politics* 83 (3): 902-916.

Ash, Elliot, Massimo Morelli, and Vannoni, Matia. 2022. "Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform," *Political Science Research and Methods* 10 (1): 82-96.

Potter, Rachel Augustine. 2023. "Privatizing Personnel: Bureaucratic Outsourcing & the Administrative Presidency." <https://www.dannyhayes.org/uploads/6/9/8/5/69858539/rap.privatizingpersonnel.2023spring.pdf>.

V. *Organization, Politicization, Capacity, and Reputation* (2/10, 2/17)

- Huber, John D., and Nolan McCarty. 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform," *American Political Science Review* 98 (3): 481-494.
- Lowande, Kenneth. 2019. "Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies," *Journal of Politics* 81 (1): 33-48.
- Richardson, Mark D. 2019. "Politicization and Expertise: Exit, Effort, and Investment," *Journal of Politics* 81 (3): 878-891.
- Decarolis, Francesco, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence on Procurement Outcomes," *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization* 36 (3): 537-597.
- Bils, Peter. 2020. "Policymaking with Multiple Agencies," *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (3): 634-648.
- Potter, Rachel Augustine. 2022. "Macro Outsourcing: Evaluating Government Reliance on the Private Sector," *Journal of Politics* 84 (2): 960-974.
- Foarta, Dana. 2023. "How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability," *American Journal of Political Science* 67 (3): 776-789.
- Mastorocco, Nicola, and Edoardo Teso. 2023. "State Capacity as an Organizational Problem. Evidence from the Growth of the US State Over 100 Years." <https://www.nber.org/papers/w31591>
- Bednar, Nicholas R., and David E. Lewis. 2024. "Presidential Investment in the Administrative State," *American Political Science Review* 118 (1): 442-457.
- Bednar, Nicholas Ryan. 2024. "Bureaucratic Autonomy and the Policymaking Capacity of United States Agencies, 1998–2021," *Political Science Research and Methods* 12 (3): 652-665.
- Other papers of potential interest:
- Callander, Steven. 2008. "A Theory of Policy Expertise," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 3 (2): 123-140.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2010. *Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA*. Princeton University Press.
- Carpenter, Daniel P., and George A. Krause. 2012. "Reputation and Public Administration," *Public Administration Review* 72 (1): 26-32.

- Patty, John, and Sean Gailmard. 2012. *Learning while Governing*.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John Patty. 2013. "Stovepiping," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25 (3): 388–411.
- Jo, Jinhee, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2014. "The Importance of Bureaucratic Hierarchy: Conflicting Preferences, Incomplete Control, and Policy Outcomes," *Economics and Politics* 26 (1): 157-183.
- Selin, Jennifer L. 2015. "What Makes an Agency Independent?" *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 971-987.
- Kogan, Vlad. 2017. "Administrative Centralization and Bureaucratic Responsiveness: Evidence from the Food Stamp Program," *Journal of Administration Research and Theory* 4 (1): 629-646.
- Anastasopoulos, L Jason, and Andrew B Whitford. 2019. "Machine Learning for Public Administration Research, With Application to Organizational Reputation," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (3): 491–510.
- Hollibaugh, Gary E. 2019. "The Use of Text as Data Methods in Public Administration: A Review and an Application to Agency Priorities." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 29 (3): 474-490.
- Li, Christopher M., Greg Sasso, and Ian R. Turner. 2020. "Accountability in Government Hierarchies," unpublished paper. <file:///C:/Users/lrot/Downloads/LiSassoTurner-Mar2020-ONLINE.pdf>
- Bertelli, Anthony M., and Madalina Busuioc. 2021. "Reputation-Sourced Authority and the Prospect of Unchecked Bureaucratic Power," *Public Administration Review* 81 (1): 38-48.
- Limbocker, Scott, Mark D. Richardson, and Jennifer L. Selin. 2022. "The Politicization Conversation: A Call to Better Define and Measure the Concept," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 52 (1): 10-37.
- Forand, Jean Guillaume, Michael M. Ting, and Gergely Ujhelyi. 2022. "Bureaucrats and Policies in Equilibrium Administrations," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 21 (3): 815-863.

VI. Appointment Processes I (2/24—to be rescheduled or online)

McCarty, Nolan, and Rose Razaghian. 1999. "Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations, 1885-1996," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 1122-1143.

McCarty, Nolan. 2004. "The Appointments Dilemma," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 413-428.

Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*, chs. 3-5.

Note: Entire book is available online at

<https://catalog.lib.rochester.edu/vwebv/holdingsInfo?searchId=482&recCount=50&recPointer=0&bibId=7279800&searchType=7>.

Jo, Jinhee, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 2012. "Rational Incompetence," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 24 (1): 3-18.

VII. Appointment Processes II (3/3)

Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2018. "The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations: Integrating Agency Independence and Appointee Ideology," *American Journal of Political Science* 62 (2): 296-311.

Kinane, Christina M. 2021. "Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments," *American Political Science Review* 115 (2): 599-614.

Piper, Christopher, and David E. Lewis. 2023. "Do Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance?." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 33 (2): 313-328.

Hollibaugh, Gary E., and George A. Krause. 2024. "Executive Appointee Reliability under Separated Powers: Presidential Loyalty Among Leaders of U.S. Federal Agencies," *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy* 5 (3): 415-441.

Richardson, Mark D., Christopher Piper, and Lewis, David E. 2024. "Measuring the Impact of Appointee Vacancies on U.S. Federal Agency Performance," *Journal of Politics*. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/730735>.

Other pieces of potential interest:

- Gallo, Nick, and David E. Lewis. 2012. "The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Federal Agency Performance," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 2 (2): 219-243.
- Hollibaugh, Gary. 2014. "Naïve Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 25 (2): 341-372.
- Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr., Gabe Horton, and David E. Lewis. 2014. "Presidents and Patronage," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 1024–1042.
- Bonica, Adam, Jowei Chen, and Tim Johnson. 2015. "Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of "Inferior Offices," and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 10 (1): 5-40.
- Krause, George A., and Anne Joseph O'Connell. 2016. "Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments," *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 914–931.
- Waterman, Richard W., and Yu Ouyang. 2020. "Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments," *Public Administration Review* 80 (5): 717-732.
- Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2021. "The Structure of Appointment Politics: Consistency or Change?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46 (2): 391-426.
- Lim, Claire S.H. and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2021. "What Shapes the Quality and Behavior of Government Officials? Institutional Variation in Selection and Retention Methods," *Annual Review of Economics* 13: 87-109.
- Resh, William G., Gary E. Hollibaugh, Patrick S. Roberts, and Matthew M. Dull. 2021. "Appointee Vacancies in US Executive Branch Agencies," *Journal of Public Policy* 41 (4): 653-676.
- Krause, George A., and Jason S. Byers. 2022. "Confirmation Dynamics: Differential Vetting in the Appointment of US Federal Agency Leaders," *Journal of Politics* 84 (2): 1189-1201.

VIII. Putting Agencies in the Policy Space (3/17)

Chen, Jowei, and Tim Johnson. 2015. "Federal Employee Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy: Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27 (1): 151-174.

Bertelli, Anthony M., Dyana P. Mason, Jennifer M. Connolly, and David A. Gastwirth. 2015. "Measuring Agency Attributes with Attitudes Across Time: A Method and Examples Using Large-Scale Federal Surveys," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 25 (2): 513-544.

Richardson, Mark D., Joshua D. Clinton, and David E. Lewis. 2018. "Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill," *Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 303-308.

Acs, Alex. 2019. "Ideal Point Estimation in Political Hierarchies: A Framework and an Application to the US Executive Branch," *Journal of Law & Economics* 36 (1): 207-230.

Spenkuch, Jorg L., Edoardo Teso, and Guo Xu. 2023. "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations," *Econometrica* 91 (4): 1171-1203.

Other pieces of potential interest:

Clinton, Joshua, and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences" *Political Analysis* 16 (1): 3-20.

Bertelli, Anthony M., and Christian R. Grose. 2011. "The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (4): 767-781.

Clinton, Joshua D., Anthony M. Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis, and David C. Nixon. 2012. "Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (2): 341-354.

Feinstein, Brian D., and Abby K. Wood. 2022. "Divided Agencies." *Southern California Law Review* (2022): 731-784.

IX. Rulemaking and Administrative Procedures I (3/24)

McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3 (2): 243-277.

Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2017. "Participation, Process, & Policy: The Informational Value of Politicized Judicial Review," *Journal of Public Policy* 37 (3): 233-260.

Potter, Rachel. 2017. "Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking," *Journal of Politics* 79 (3): 841-855.

Lowande, Kenneth, and Rachel Potter. 2020. "Congressional Oversight Revisited: Politics and Procedure in Agency Rulemaking," *Journal of Politics* 83 (1): 401-408.

Feinstein, Brian D., and Abby K. Wood. 2021. "Divided Agencies," *Southern California Law Review* 95 (4): 731-784.

X. Rulemaking and Administrative Procedures II (3/31)

Bolton, Alexander, Rachel Augustine Potter, and Sharece Thrower. 2016. "Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 32 (2): 242-271.

Haeder, Simon, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2018. "Presidentially Directed Policy Change: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as Partisan or Moderator?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 28 (4): 475-488.

Potter, Rachel Augustine, and Charles R. Shipan. 2019. "Agency Rulemaking in a Separation of Powers System," *Journal of Public Policy* 39 (1): 89-113.

Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Jonathan Klingler. 2023. "Rule Significance and Interbranch Competition in Rulemaking Processes." *American Political Science Review* 117 (4): 1506-1521.

Carpenter, Daniel, et al. 2024. "Inequality in Agency Rulemaking," <https://judgelord.github.io/finreg/participatory-inequality.pdf>.

Other papers of potential interest:

- Yackee, Jason Webb, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2010. ““Is Agency Rulemaking ‘Ossified’? Testing Congressional, Presidential, and Judicial Procedural Constraints,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 20 (2): 261-282.
- Nelson, David, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2012. “Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking,” *Journal of Politics* 74 (2): 339-353.
- Jordan, Stuart. 2007. “OIRA Review and Presidential Control of Agencies,” unpublished paper. PhD dissertation, Princeton.
- Acs, Alex, and Charles Cameron. 2013. “Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the Agencies?” *Political Research Quarterly* 43 (3): 443-467.
- Sunstein, Cass R. 2013. “Commentary: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,” *Harvard Law Review* 126: 1838-1879.
- Raso, Connor, and William West. 2013. “Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 23 (3): 495-519.
- Bubb, Ryan, and Patrick L. Warren. 2014. “Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review,” *Journal of Legal Studies* 43 (1): 95-135.
- Carpenter, Daniel, and Jesse Gubb. 2014. “A Political Clearinghouse? Organizational and Presidential Effects in OIRA Review,”
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_33430.pdf
- Raso, Connor. 2015. “Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures,” *Administrative Law Review* 67 (1): 65-132.
- Doherty, Kathleen M., and Jennifer L. Selin. 2015. “Does Congress Differentiate? Administrative Procedures, Information Gathering, and Political Control.”
http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/741/docs/Panel_4a_paper1_DohertySelin_Does_Congress_Differentiate_SoCLASS_USC_2015.pdf
- Rodriguez, Daniel B., and Barry R. Weingast. 2015. “The “Reformation of Administrative Law” Revisited,” *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 31 (4): 782-807.

- Boushey, Graeme and Robert McGrath. 2017. "Experts, Amateurs, and Bureaucratic Influence in the American States," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 27 (1): 85-103.
- Lewis, David E., Mark D. Richardson, and Eric Rosenthal. 2019. "OMB in its Management Role: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Executives," unpublished paper. <https://cdn.vanderbilt.edu/vu-my/wp-content/uploads/sites/411/2011/12/03103617/lre-omb-paper.pdf>
- Yackee, Susan Webb. 2019. "The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States," *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 37-55.
- Potter, Rachel. 2019. *Bending the Rules*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bils, Peter, Robert J. Carroll, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2020. "Strategic Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures," unpublished paper.
- Yackee, Susan Webb. 2020. "Hidden Politics? Assessing Lobbying Success During US Agency Guidance Development," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 30 (4): 548-562.
- Bils, Peter, Robert J. Carroll, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2024. "Strategic Avoidance and Rulemaking Procedures," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 36 (2): 156-185.
- XI. Separation of Powers/Congress/President/Courts (4/17, 4/14, 4/21)*
1. Separation of Powers
- Callander, Steven, and Keith Kreihbiel. 2014. "Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 819-834.
- Richardson, Mark D. 2024. "Characterizing Agencies' Political Environments: Partisan Agreement and Disagreement in the US Executive Branch," *Journal of Politics* 86 (3): 1110-1114.

2. Congress

- Clinton, Joshua D., David E. Lewis and Jennifer L. Selin. 2014. "Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (2): 387-401.
- Wood, Abby K., and David E. Lewis. 2017. "Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 27 (4): 581-595.
- Ritchie, Melinda. 2017. "Back-Channel Representation: A Study of the Strategic Communication of Senators with the US Department of Labor," *Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 240-253.
- Feinstein, Brian D. 2018. "Congress in the Administrative State," *Washington University Law Review* 95 (5): 1187-1248.
- Patty, John W., and Ian R. Turner. 2021. "Ex Post Review and Expert Policymaking: When Does Oversight Reduce Accountability?" *Journal of Politics* 83 (1): 23-39.
- Kroeger, Mary A. 2022. "Bureaucrats as Lawmakers," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 47 (1): 257-289.
- Lee, Kyuwon, and Hye Young You. 2023. "Bureaucratic Revolving Doors and Interest Group Participation in Policy Making." *Journal of Politics* 85 (2): 701-717.
- Bellodi, Lucca. 2024. "'Bureaucratic Information in Congress.'" https://lucabellodi.com/material/Bureaucratic_Information_in_Congress.pdf
- Ban, Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, and Hye Young You. 2024. "Bureaucrats in Congress: The Politics of Interbranch Information Sharing."
- Prato, Carlo, and Ian R. Turner. 2024. "Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade,," *American Journal of Political Science*.

3. Presidency

- Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2014. "The Elusive Search for Presidential Power," *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 653-668.
- Acs, Alex. 2018. "Policing the Administrative State," *Journal of Politics* 80 (4): 1225-1238.

4. Courts

Turner, Ian R. 2016. "Working Smart *and* Hard? Agency Effort, Judicial Review, and Policy Precision," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29 (1): 69–96.

Other papers of potential interest:

Eskridge, William N., and Connor Raso. 2010. "Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases," *Columbia Law Review* 110: 1727-1819.

Barnett, Kent, Christina L. Boyd, and Christopher J. Walker. 2018. "The Politics of Selecting *Chevron* Deference," *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 15 (3): 597-619.

Antic, Nemanja, and Matias Iaryczower. 2020. "Beyond Delegation: Agency Discretion when Budgets Matter."
<https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/antic/BeyondDelegation.pdf>

Rogowski, Jon C. 2020. "The Administrative Presidency and Public Trust in Bureaucracy," *Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy* 1 (1): 27-51.

Acs, Alex. 2021. "Presidential Directives in a Resistant Bureaucracy," *Journal of Public Policy* 41 (4):776-797.

Bolton, Alexander. 2022. "Gridlock, Bureaucratic Control, and Nonstatutory Policymaking in Congress," *American Journal of Political Science* 66 (1): 238-254.

Lodato, Simon, Christos Mavridis, and Federico Vaccari. 2024. "Political Pandering and Bureaucratic Influence." <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.17526>

XII. Student Presentations (4/28)

Some Data Sources:

<http://web.stanford.edu/~bonica/data.html> Adam Bonica's Ideal Points

<https://agencydata.wordpress.com/> Relatively old agency preference data

<http://www.tim-j.com/bureaucratic-ideal-points/> Chen-Johnson agency ideal point scores

<http://www.fedview.opm.gov/> Federal Employee View Survey; see also
<http://www.mrichardson.info/data>

<http://www.tim-j.com/feddata/> Federal Personnel Surveys

<http://www.performance.gov/> Government Assessments of Agency Performance

<https://www.epstein.wustl.edu/jcs>: Judicial Common Space Scores

<https://judjis.org/> Jurist-Derived Judicial Ideology Scores

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html> PART scores

<http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/PIMP/index.htm> Political Ideology Measurement Project

<https://sfgs.princeton.edu/>: Survey of the Future of Government Service

<https://sunlightfoundation.com/api/>: Various big data; note the foundation pulled the plug, but a number of the datasets have been farmed out

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/harvard/?q=alex%20acs>: Includes Alex Acs' agency ideal point estimates

<https://asap.wisc.edu/>: American State Administrators Project

Review Papers that Might Be Helpful:

- Dal Bó, Ernest. 2006. "Regulatory Capture: A Review," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22 (2): 203-225.
- Krause, George. 2011. "Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies," *Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy*.
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238958.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199238958-e-22>
- Lewis, David. 2011. "Presidential Appointments and Personnel," *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. "Formal Models of Bureaucracy," *Annual Review of Political Science*.
- Moe, Terry M. 2013. "Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy," in *Handbook of Organizational Economics*.
- Krause, George A., and Neal D. Woods. 2014. "Policy Delegation, Comparative Institutional Capacity, and Administrative Politics in the American States," *Oxford Handbook of State and Local Government*.
<https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.ezp.lib.rochester.edu/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579679.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199579679-e-015>
- McCann, Pamela J. Clouser, Douglas M. Spencer, and Abby K. Wood. 2021 "Measuring State Capture," *Wisconsin Law Review* 2021 (5):1141-1186.
- Brierley, Sarah, Kenneth Lowande, Rachel Augustine Potter, and Guillermo Toral. 2023. "Bureaucratic Politics: Blindspots and Opportunities in Political Science," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2023. 26: 271–90.
<https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-061621-084933>.