Tasos Kalandrakis
- Professor of Political Science
PhD, UCLA, 2000
- Office Location
- 109C Harkness Hall
- Telephone
- (585) 273-4902
- Web Address
- Website
Office Hours: By appointment
Research Overview
Research Interests
- Political Economics
Selected Publications
- “Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model,”Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
- “Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model,”Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming.
- “A theory of minority and majority governments,”Political Science Research and Methods, 3(2): 309-328, 2015.
- “Dynamic legislative policy-making” (with John Duggan) Journal of Economic Theory, 147(5): 1653-1688, 2012.
- “Radical moderation: recapturing power in two-party parliamentary systems” (with Arthur Spirling) American Journal of Political Science, 56(2): 413-432, 2012.
- “A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games,” (with John Duggan) Social Choice and Welfare, 36(3-4): 611-650, 2011.
- “Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo,”International Journal of Game Theory, 39(4): 617-643, 2010.
- “Rationalizable voting,”Theoretical Economics, 5(1): 93-125, 2010.
- “A reputational theory of two-party competition,”Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 4(4): 343-378, 2009.
- “Robust rational turnout,”Economic Theory, 41(2): 317-343, 2009.
- “Dynamics of the presidential veto: a computational analysis” (with John Duggan and Vikram Manjunath), Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 48: 1570-1589, 2008.
- “On participation games with complete information,”International Journal of Game Theory, 35(3): 337-352, 2007.
- “Proposal rights and political power,”American Journal of Political Science, 50(2): 441-448, 2006.
- “Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games,”Economic Theory, 28(2): 309-329, 2006.
- “Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations,”Economics Letters, 84(3): 407-411, 2004.
- “A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game,”Journal of Economic Theory, 116(2): 294-322, 2004.
- “Bicameral winning coalitions and equilibrium federal legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXIX: 49-79, 2004.
- “Legislative procedures in the EU: an empirical analysis,” (with George Tsebelis, Chris Jensen, and Amy Kreppel), British Journal of Political Science, 31(4): 573-599, 2001.
- “European parliament and environmental legislation: the case of chemicals,” (with George Tsebelis) European Journal of Political Research, 36(1): 119-154, 1999.