Political Science 574: International Political Economy

Fall 2004, Monday, 12:30-3:15

Randall Stone

Associate Professor of Political Science

University of Rochester

randall.stone@rochester.edu

Purpose of the course: This is an advanced course intended for Ph.D. students. The course conducts a broad survey of the field, focusing on the politics of substantive international economic issues, including trade, macroeconomic policy coordination, foreign debt and economic adjustment, European integration, and environmental regulation.

Course Requirements: There are two possible tracks for completing the course. In Track I, students are expected to write short (2-page) papers critiquing the assigned readings for each week, due Monday at 9:00 am. In Track II, students do not write short papers but instead write a data-based research paper (20-25 pages, described below). A draft of the research paper is due October 29 at 5:00 pm, and the final version is due Dec. 20 at 12:00 noon. Since the paper is optional, no extensions will be granted. If the final version is not submitted, the draft version will be graded instead. In addition, all students will take a 24-hour take-home final exam, due Dec. 11 at 12:00 noon. Grading: 1/3 class participation, 1/3 papers/final paper, 1/3 final.

Research Papers: Although the papers are short (no more than 25 pages, please), the standards are high. The papers are expected to formulate a hypothesis, ground it in appropriate literature, illustrate an argument or puzzle using qualitative evidence, and test the hypothesis using quantitative evidence. If you plan to choose this track, speak to me before the second class so I can get you started. This option is meant as an opportunity to get a start on a second-year paper.

Readings: The following books are recommended for purchase; I recommend ordering on-line.

· Rogowski, Ronald. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989.

· North, Douglass C. and Robert Paul Thomas. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973.

· Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

· Kirschner, Jonathan. Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

· Oye, Kenneth. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993.

· Simmons, Beth. Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994).

· Helleiner, Eric. States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1994).

· Stone, Randall W. Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002).

· Luterbacher, Urs and Detlef F. Sprinz. International Relations and Global Climate Change. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001.

Course Outline:

Monday, Sept. 13: International Political Economy and Contemporary Paradigmatic Debates

Monday, Sept. 20: International Trade and Domestic Politics

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. “Protection for Sale.”

The American Economic Review, 84 (4) (Sept., 1994), pp. 833-850. JSTOR.

Frieden, Jeffry A., and Ronald Rogowski. “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview.” In Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Rogowski, Ronald. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989.

Hiscox, Michael J. “Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation.” American Political Science Review 96 (3) (September 2002): 593-608.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94 (2) (June 2000): 305-22.

Dai, Xinyuan, critique, and response by MMR. American Political Science Review 96 (1) (March 2002); 159-70.

Monday, Sept. 27: The Evolution of the World Political Economy

North, Douglass C. and Robert Paul Thomas. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973.

Monday, Oct. 4: International Institutions and International Cooperation

Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).

Vaubel, Roland. “A Public Choice Approach to International Organization.” Public Choice 51 (1986): 39-57.

Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform.” International Organization 57 (2) (Spring 2003): 241-76.

Thurs, Oct. 11: Economic Power

Kirshner, Jonathan. Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995). Chpts. 3-5 (pp. 45-215.)

Drezner, Daniel W. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999.) Chpts. 2-4.

Monday, Oct. 18: Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism

Oye, Kenneth. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements.” International Organization 57 (4) (Fall 2003): 829-62.

Odell, John S. Negotiating the World Economy. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000). Chpt. 6.

Monday, Oct. 25: Macroeconomic Coordination

Simmons, Beth. Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994).

Drazen, Allen. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Chpt. 12, Part I (pp. 529-59.)

Odell, (2000). Chpt. 4.

Monday, Nov. 1: International Debt

Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt." Journal of Political Economy 97, No. 1 (1989).

Aggarwal, Vinod K. Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996). Chpts. 1-4, 11, 13, 14.

Tomz, Michael. “Finance and Trade: Issue Linkage and the Enforcement of International Debt Contracts.” Paper presented at the 2004 APSA Meetings, Chicago.

Monday, Nov. 8: Economic Adjustment and the IMF

Stone, Randall W. Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002).

Pauly, Louis. Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World Economy. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997). Chpts. 5-6.

Monday, Nov. 15: Globalization?

Helleiner, Eric. States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1994).

Leblang, David, and William Bernard. “The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies.” International Organization 54 (2) (Spring 2000): 291-324.

Wibbels, Erik, and Moises Arce. “Globalization, Taxation, and Burden-Shifting in Latin America.” International Organization 57 (1) (Winter 2003): 111-36.

Monday, Nov. 22: Integration and Exclusion: The European Union

Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998. Chpts. 5-6, pp. 314-471.

Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett. 2001. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union” International Organization 55(2):357-90.

Hall, Peter A., and Robert J. Franzese, Jr. “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union.” International Organization 52 (3) (Summer 1998): 505-36.

Henning, C. Randall. “Systemic Conflict and Monetary Integration in Europe.” International Organization 52 (3) (Summer 1998): 537-74.

Maurer, Andreas. “The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European Parliament,” Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2) (April 2003): 227-47.

Hanson, Brian T. “What Happened to Fortress Europe? External Trade Policy Liberalization in the European Union.” International Organization 52 (1) (Winter 1998): 55-86.

Monday, Nov. 29: International Environmental Institutions

Luterbacher, Urs and Detlef F. Sprinz. International Relations and Global Climate Change. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. Chpts. 1-2, 4-5, 8, 11-12.

Monday, Dec. 6: Student presentations

Wednesday, Dec. 15: Final exam due, 4:00 pm

Monday, Dec. 20: Final paper due, if applicable